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The notion that social networks in labor markets play a critical role is intuitively appealing
and has attracted attention by the literature at least since Mark S. Granovetter (1973). The
empirical literature has shown that reliance on informal methods varies across demographic
groups, but has not yet fully clari¯ed how the pattern of employment and earnings payo®s
to networks varies across groups [Yannis M. Ioannides and Linda D. Loury (2004)]. Recent
theoretical advances, including Antoni Calv¶ o-Armengol (2004), whose antecedent is Scott
A. Boorman (1975), and Calv¶ o-Armengol and Matthew O. Jackson (2004) show that social
networks may explain salient characteristics of the labor market such as positive correlation
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1of employment across agents and time and duration dependence in the likelihood of obtaining
a job.
Only about one-third of overall earnings inequality may be explained by individual char-
acteristics as gender, education and age [Laurence F. Katz and David H. Autor (1999)].
Residual or within-group inequality, which has notably increased for the United States in the
1980s and 1990s, has been attributed to search frictions, inter alia. Such frictions may cause
otherwise identical workers to earn di®erent wages [Dale T. Mortensen (2003)].
This paper shows analytically that workers who are better connected socially experience
lower unemployment rates and receive higher wage rates in the average. It represents social
connections in the labor market by a random graph, with nodes as individuals and edges as
connections. The number of others each individual is connected with, the \degree," obeys
an arbitrary probability distribution. In this fashion this paper extends previous research
that in some cases assumes complete networks (everyone connected to everyone else) and
in other cases balanced networks (everyone connected to an equal number of others) [c.f.
Calv¶ o-Armengol and Yves Zenou (2005), C-A&Z below, for short].
I. Job Matching in a Random Social Network
We follow Christopher A. Pissarides (2000), as adapted by C-A&Z, and consider a large
number of workers who are ex ante identical with respect to job performance. Similarly, ¯rms
are identical with respect to productivity. At the beginning of each discrete-time period,
each worker may receive information about a job opening directly from an employer, with
probability equal to the vacancy rate, v: Jobs break up at the end of each period with
constant probability ±: If a worker is employed when the job opening information arrives, she
passes it on to a randomly selected unemployed acquaintance. If none of her acquaintances
are unemployed, the information is lost. Thus unemployed workers receive job information
either directly or indirectly. Newly employed workers go through an one-period probation,
during which their earnings are equal to y0, which without loss of generality is set equal to
0: In the following period, workers' productivity becomes y1 > 0 and stays at that level for
2the duration of employment. Thus newly employed workers have no incentive to use new job
openings to increase their current wage. Employers have perfect information about workers'
social connections when wage bargaining takes place.
Agents are matched with other workers by being embedded in an exogenous but random
social network. Unlike C-A&Z, workers di®er with respect to the number k of other workers
each is in contact with: k; a worker's degree, has a frequency distribution function denoted
by p = (p0;p1;:::;pk;:::): Having more links is better for an individual but not necessarily
socially e±cient, as C-A&Z show, because vacancies may not be ¯lled due to coordination
failure. However, we show that this result is sensitive to the nature of the social network.
E.g., in the case of a Poisson degree distribution the monotonicity of matching is e®ectively
restored.
A property of our model is noteworthy. The probability that a particular worker, chosen
randomly from among a given worker's contacts, is connected with k other workers is not
equal to pk [Mark E. J. Newman (2003)]. To see this consider that a worker with m other
contacts is m times more likely to be reached than for a worker with one contact. So,
the degree distribution of an worker thus selected is fk ´
kpk P
j jpj: This connection bias is
conceptually akin to length-biased sampling in unemployment statistics.
Connection bias allows us to derive that a randomly chosen social contact of a typical
worker transmit job opening information to her with probability:







1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹ u)k
io
; (1)
where the probability for one's contacts to be unemployed may depend on the number of their
own contacts j; uj; and write u = (u0;u1;:::): The probability for a worker with ¸ contacts
to receive job opening information through her social contacts is given by
P(¸; ¹ u;v;p;u) = 1 ¡ [1 ¡ v~ q]
¸ : (2)
Note that this probability is decreasing with the covariance between a worker's employment
rate and the employment rate of a worker's contacts. The larger this covariance, the higher
3the probability that an unemployed individual would hear from her social contacts about job
openings. The higher the mean unemployment rate, the less important is the e®ect from the
other contacts of one's own contacts, because they are themselves more likely to need the
information.
The properties of probability function P(¸; ¹ u;v;p;u) are discussed in the remainder of
this paper for a special case of (1), when each person assumes her contacts' unemployment
rates are equal to the mean unemployment. This probability is, one, increasing and concave
in the number of a worker's contacts; two, decreasing in the mean unemployment rate in
the economy; and three, increasing in the vacancy rate. In contrast to C-A&Z, Ioannides
and Adriaan R. Soetevent (2005), I&S for short, show that the function P(¢)'s being convex
in ¹ u over some range depends on whether one's own number of contacts does not exceed a
threshold value, which itself increases with the mean degree.
A. The job matching function
De¯ning the expected probability for a worker to hear of a vacancy either directly or
indirectly as the job matching function, m(u;v;p) =
PL¡1
¸=0 p¸u¸[v + (1 ¡ v)P(¸; ¹ u;v;p)]; we






p¸u¸h(¸; ¹ u;v;p); (3)
where h(¸; ¹ u;v;p) ´ v + (1 ¡ v)P(¸; ¹ u;v;p) stands for the probability that an unemployed
worker with ¸ contacts hears of a vacancy. Proposition 2, I&S, op. cit., proves that the
probability that a worker hears of a vacancy is increasing in u¸; and is increasing and strictly
concave in the vacancy rate.
II. Labor Market Equilibrium
By adapting the Pissarides model as modi¯ed by C-A&Z, we work with the associated
Bellman equations at the steady state for I¸
F; the intertemporal pro¯t for a job's being ¯lled
by a worker with ¸ contacts, and for IV ; the expected value of opening a vacancy at the
beginning of a typical period. In our case the pro¯t of a ¯lled job depends, through the wage
4rate, on the number of contacts held by a worker who ¯lls the job:
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where the expectation is taken with respect to g(¸); a probability distribution function that is
speci¯ed as follows. In order to account for connection bias | this time with regard to ¯rms
with vacancies being more likely to be ¯lled by agents with more links | the expectation is





Equilibrium with free entry implies that the value to ¯rms from opening a vacancy is
driven down to 0, IV = 0: Solving for I¸
F yields: I¸
F = (y1 ¡ w¸
1)1+r
r+±: That is, the value of
¯lling a vacancy is equal to the expected present value of a °ow of net pro¯t, adjusted for












That is, the expected rate of pro¯t per vacancy ¯lled is equal to the amortized ¯xed costs of
hiring, adjusted for the likelihood of jobs' breaking up.
A. Wages
Turning to the labor supply side, we index by ¸ the expected lifetime income of an
employed and an unemployed worker at the beginning of a period and before vacancies are
posted, I¸
E and I¸
U; respectively. The Bellman equations at the steady state imply that the






The wage rate w¸
1 is determined from a Nash bargain, in which workers' power is denoted
by ¯ 2 [0;1]. The wage rate maximizes (I¸
E ¡ I¸
U)¯(I¸
F ¡ IV )1¡¯: This yields a wage rate
schedule, conditional on the number of contacts by a worker:
w¸
1 =
¯(r + ±) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)h(¸; ¹ u;v;p)
r + ± + ¯(1 ¡ ±)h(¸; ¹ u;v;p)
y1: (8)
5It follows that a worker may extract a better bargain the more options she has in the form of
a greater number of contacts. This is re°ected in the wage bargain via the probability that
an unemployed worker hears of a vacancy through the social structure. Also, the greater is
¯; a worker's bargaining power, the higher the wage rate.
B. Steady-state labor market equilibrium
Job creation and job destruction are assumed to take place as follows. At the beginning of
each period, some of the unemployed ¯nd jobs. At the end of each period, employed workers,
which includes newly hired and incumbent employees, lose their jobs because jobs break up
randomly, with probability ±. At the steady state for each type of worker, the °ow into
unemployment from the breakup of jobs, ±p¸(1 ¡ u¸); equals that of out of unemployment
because of job taking, (1¡±)p¸u¸h(¸; ¹ u;v;p): We thus arrive at individual Beveridge curves,
one for each worker type:
u¸ =
±
± + (1 ¡ ±)h(¸; ¹ u;v;p)
; 8¸: (9)
This is an inverse relationship between unemployment and vacancy rates. Workers with more
social contacts incur lower unemployment rates.
A steady state equilibrium of this economy must satisfy the labor demand equations,
the individual Beveridge equations, and the wage functions, (7{9). However, it su±ces to
¯nd equilibrium values of the unemployment rates for all worker types and the vacancy rate:
(u¤;v¤): Using (8) in (7) and recalling the de¯nition of the function h(¢), yields a condition








(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ±)
: (10)
I&S give su±cient conditions, in terms of an upper bound for the job breakup probability
as a function of all parameters of the model and of a lower bound that involves endogenous
variables, for existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium given any degree
distribution p:
C. Numerical Results for Poisson Degree Distributions
6We calibrate the model for Poisson degree distributions and with other parameters cho-
sen, following Francois Fontaine (2005), so as to match US data. We ¯nd that as the network
becomes denser (greater mean degree), mean unemployment falls and mean wage rate in-
creases. Unemployment and wage rates of the least connected workers are adversely a®ected
by increases in overall network density. See Figures 1 and 2. The average unemployment
rate among workers without connections is three to four times as large as the unemployment
rate of the most well connected. The wage rates of the latter are 15% to 25% higher. The
equilibrium vacancy rate falls with network density, because of the higher wage rates ¯rms
have to pay due to workers' increased bargaining power. Interestingly, the matching function
monotonically increases with network density. This is in contrast to C-A&Z, who identify
a critical network density above which matching declines. So, at least with random graphs
with Poisson distributions, the monotonicity of the Pissarides matching function is restored.
See I&S for full details.
III. Conclusions
Wage dispersion in our model is generated by di®erences in the number of contacts workers
have with other workers. We contrast by brie°y considering closely related previous literature.
Mortensen and Tara Vishwanath (1994) obtain wage dispersion because job o®ers obtained
through referrals from employed social contacts are higher than those received directly from
employers. Unlike our model, theirs does not incorporate competition for job-related infor-
mation among an informed worker's social contacts, nor does it deal with workers' social
networks as such. Variation in the number of links between ¯rms and workers is emphasized
by Kenneth J. Arrow and Ron Borzekowski (2004). They use simulations to show that 15%
of the unexplained variation in wages may be explained by the number of ties between ¯rms
and workers. Fontaine, op. cit., models the evolution of employment and wages in a com-
plete social network. He shows by simulation that stochastic matching leads to a stationary
distribution that is associated with signi¯cant wage di®erentials among otherwise identical
workers. Samuel Bentolila, Claudio Michelacci and Javier Suarez (2004) test a Pissarides-
7style matching model that trades o® higher productivity in the \formal" economy against
an e®ect of personal contacts in shortening unemployment spells at the cost of a lower wage
rate. Using United States and European Union data, they ¯nd a wage discount of 3% to
5% for jobs found through personal contacts. Their regressions control for industries and oc-
cupations, and for measures of cognitive ability and own demographic characteristics. They
attribute the wage discount to occupational mismatch. Research that allows for individual
background characteristics to in°uence connectedness, and combines with referrals, workers'
links to ¯rms and assortative matching deserves attention in the future.
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1Figure 1: Wage dispersion when the degree distribution is Poisson,
pk = e¡µµk=k! 8k; µ = 3 (o); µ = 5 (¤); µ = 10 (+) and µ = 20 (¢).

















3Figure 2: Unemployment distribution when the degree distribution is
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